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TOWARD DUE PROCESS IN 
INJUNCTION PROCEDURE 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Doug Rendleman* 
FIVE recent Illinois cases illustrate the law of collateral attack o:n 
injunctions. These decisions not only reveal the strengths of the 
present taw, but also the confusion, complexity, and inutility of the 
doctrine which currently exists. This article will discuss the existing 
law, point out problems, and suggest an analysis which will clarify the 
law and allow it to serve the underlying social interests. 
ll. THE PRESENT LAW 
City of Chicago v. King1 grew out of Martin Luther King's civil 
rights activity in Chicago in August 1966. Several major disturbances 
had resulted from a series of planned demonstrations in different Chi-
cago neighborhoods at approximately the same time. These demon-
strations attracted large, hostile crowds which allegedly endangered the 
persons and property of .the marchers and other citizens. Thereafter 
the police sought an injunction because they were concerned about un-
reasonable waste of police manpower. On August 19, following a 
hearing, a temporary injunction was awarded to the plaintiffs requiring 
that written notice be given to the police 24 hours before ~any march. 
Frank Ditto, one of the leaders of the marches, was present in 
court when the injunction was granted. On August 22 he called a 
10:00 a.m. press conference to state his belief that the injunction was 
an unwarranted usurpation of his constitutional rights and to announce 
his intention to defy the court injunction. A copy of the injunction was 
served on Ditto at 10:30 a.m; and on the same day he conducted a 
march without giving prior notice to ·the police. 
Ditto was charged with contempt of court. As a defense, he 
maintained that the temporary injunction order abridged his constitu-
tional rights and therefore was void. The circuit court ruled that the 
only proper questions before it were jurisdiction of the parties, juris-
diction of the subject matter, and whether the injunction had been 
disobeyed. The constitutionality of the injunction was held not rele-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe College of Law; J.D. 1968, 
University of Iowa; LL.M. 1970, University of Michigan. 
1. 86 Ill App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 
(1967). 
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vant to the charge of contempt. Ditto did not refute the evidence of 
disobedience, was convicted of contempt, and sentenced to six months 
in jail. He appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. 
The second case, Board of Junior College District 508 v. Cook 
County College Teachers Union, Local 1600,2 originated in a teachers 
strike. The union, which had been recognized as the exclusive repre-
sentative for the faculty, and the board which operated junior colleges 
in the Chicago area, were negotiating a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Progress was slow and on November 30, 1966, the board ob-
tained a temporary injunction which prohibited the union from striking 
or picketing. Nevertheless, Norman Swenson and others picketed after 
a strike was cal'led. The strike was settled and the board's attorney 
moved to dissolve the temporary injunction. The trial judge refused 
to dissolve, however, and ordered the board's attorneys to commence 
contempt proceedings against Swenson and the union. The board's 
attorney declined to proceed further, and when the trial judge re-
quested the state's attorney to prepare contempt proceedings, that office 
also declined. The trial judge then appointed a member of the bar 
as amicus curiae to investigate. 
In April of 1967, the amicus curiae recommended that the union 
and Swenson show cause why they should not be held in contempt of 
court. A hearing was helld and the amicus presented evidence of 
breach of the injunction. The union was convicted of contempt and 
fined $5,000; Swenson was convicted of contempt, sentenced to 30 
days in jail, and fined $1,000. Both appealed, arguing that the tempo-
rary injunction was void and erroneous because it violated the Constitu-
tion and certain statutes. The appellate court affirmed. 
The next case, Board of Education v. Kankakee Federation of 
Teachers, Local 886,3 was a result of a teachers strike in Kankakee 
County. On April 25, 1969, the union communicated an immediate 
intent to strike to the board and picketing began the next morning. 
On Saturday April 26, at 5:45 p.m., the board's attorney, without at-
tempting to give notice to the union, secured a temporary restraining 
order which prohibited the union from striking and picketing. The 
sheriff served the order on the union members that evening, but the 
strike continued. 
On the 29th of April the board initiated contempt proceedings 
against the union. During the time between the board's petition to 
show cause and the hearing on it, the court held a hearing and issued 
a preliminary injunction. Union members attended the hearing but 
did not participate, and ignored the preliminary injunction as they had 
2. 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 998 
(1970). 
3. 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 18 (1970). 
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the temporary restraining order. Hearing on contempt for breach of 
the temporary restraining order was had on May 5. The union moved 
to dismiss, arguing that the order violated due process because it was 
granted without notice or a hearing. The trial judge denied the mo-
tion, heard evidence, found certain union members in contempt, fined 
the union $12,000, fined several union members and sentenced several 
of them to 60 days in jail. The strike ended. Those who were 
convicted of contempt appealed and the Illinois Supreme Court af-
finned. 
The fourth appellate decision, County of Peoria v. Benedict/ was 
a consequence of a nursing home strike. The union and the Peoria 
County Bel-Wood Nursing Home were at loggerheads. The superin-
tendent of the nursing home concluded that a strike was likely to begin 
on November 30, 1968. On November 27, the Wednesday before 
Thanksgiving, the union's staff representative, Harold Z. Benedict, and 
the union's secretary-treasurer were notified that a hearing on the 
county's complaint requesting an injunction would be held on Friday, 
November 29. The union did not appear at the hearing. A temporary 
injunction which barred the union from striking or picketing the Bel-
Wood Nursing Home was awarded to plaintiffs. The union struck at 
midnight on November 30 and set up picket lines at the nursing home. 
The county began proceedings on December 3. The union filed 
motions to dismiss the complaint, to vacate the injunction, and to dis-
miss the contempt proceedings. Pursuant to an interim order, a work 
force was maintained at the nursing home and controlled picketing was 
allowed. At a hearing on January 2, 1969, the union's attorney admit-
ted disobedience of the injunction; the court found contempt and fined 
the union $2,400; Benedict, $1,500; and 13 employees, $50 each. 
Benedict was sentenced to 60 days in jail. On the same date the in-
junction was made permanent. The employees, the union, and Bene-
dict appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the injunction was 
erroneous and vacated it, but affirmed the fines and sentences for con-
tempt. 
The final case, United Mine Workers of America Union Hospital 
v. United Mine Workers District 50,5 began with a strike vote against 
a nonprofit hospital in West Frankfort. The union contract with the 
hospital expired on October 31, 1969. The union decided not to work 
without a contract, and picket lines were set up at 12:02 a.m. on No-
vember 1. At 5:33 a.m. on November 1 the hospital filed a complaint 
and the circuit court granted a temporary restraining order which pro-
hibited the strike and picketing. At 7:00 a.m. the order was served 
4. 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970). 
5. 1 Ill. App. 3d 822, 275 N.E.2d 231 (5th Dist. 1971), rev'd, 52 Ill. 2d 496, 
288 N.E.2d 455 (1972) (facts taken from appellate court opinion). 
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on the union members who were in front of the hospital. The picket-
ing stopped when the order was served but began again at 1:00 p.m. 
that afternoon and continued until midmorning the next day. 
On November 3 the hospital' initiated contempt proceedings. Fol-
lowing a hearing, the circuit court found that the picketing violated 
the injunction, held the picketers in contempt of court, and levied 
fines totaling $16,270. The picketers who had been convicted of con-
tempt appealed. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court of 
Illinois reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court's 
finding of contempt. 
In all of these cases there is a common thread: an injunction or 
restraining order is issued against the defendants; the defendants act 
contrary to the injunction; the defendants are charged with contempt 
of court for violating the injunction; and the defendant-contemnors 
seek to defeat contempt by arguing that there were defects in the un-
derlying injunction. Nevertheless, the courts did not treat each case 
the same. 
The distinguishable results spring from the collateral bar rule, a 
part of the doctrinal apparatus of collateral and direct attack. Con-
tempt is a proceeding collateral to the injunction suit, and the con-
temnor, when charged with disobeying the injunction, may not argue 
as a defense to contempt that the injunction was erroneous, but only 
that it was void. 6 The difficulty is in distinguishing between orders 
which are void and subject to collateral attack and those which are 
merely erroneous. 
As illustrated by the recent cases, Illinois courts apply the col-
lateral bar rule to preclude relitigation of injunction issues in a subse-
quent contempt proceeding. Even though the injunction which was 
disobeyed is asserted to be erroneous, but not void, contempt will be 
affirmed, as it was in Benedict. 1 If the injunction is void because the 
court lacks the power to act, however, voidness of the order may be 
shown to defeat contempt. 8 The distinction between lack of power 
or voidness, and mistaken use of power or error turns on the elusive 
concept of jurisdiction. Thus, the only issues which will be examined 
upon a charge of contempt are whether the enjoining court had juris-
diction over the person of the contemnor, whether the enjoining court 
6. Musgrove v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 274 So. 2d 640, 642 (Ala. 
1972); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1966), affirmed 
with a few variations, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 
340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1967); Z. CHAFEE, SoME 
PROBLEMS OF EQmTY 297-380 (1950). 
7. See also AMF, Inc. v. International Fiberglass Co., 469 F..2d 1063, 1065 
(1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Christie, 465 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Fidanian, 465 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1972); Mathison v. Felton, 90 Idaho 
87, 408 P.2d 457 (1965). 
8. Ex parte Bryant, 155 Tex. 219, 485 S.W.2d 719 (1956). 
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had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and whether the contemnor 
violated the injunction or order.9 Seldom do the cases contain any 
difficult questions about whether the contemnor disobeyed the injunc-
tion.10 Instead, the problems arise in the areas of personal jurisdiction, 
subject matter jurisdiction, and the civil-criminal contempt distinction. 11 
Personal jurisdiction is more often assumed than examined. It is 
generally held that the defendant in an injunction proceeding must, at 
risk of contempt, obey the injunction from the time he has actual notice 
of it.12 Thus, if a person knows of the injunction by service upon him 
or otherwise, and proceeds neverthe~ess to act contrary to it, he may 
be held in contempt. 13 It is irrelevant that the procedure was ex parte 
and that the plaintiff neither served nor attempted to serve notice on 
the defendant before the injunction was granted.14 Furthermore, the 
defendant is bound even though he was accorded no opportunity to 
litigate the granting of the injunction.15 If a defendant is informed of 
an ex parte injunction, he must obey it. Otherwise, because of the col-
9. City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 349-51, 230 N.E.2d 41, 46 
(1st Dist. 1970); Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College 
Teachers Union, Local 1600, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 427-28, 262 N.E.2d 125, 129 (1st 
Dist. 1970). 
10. UMWA Union Hosp. v. UMWA Dist. 50, 1 Ill. App. 3d 822, 275 N.E.2d 
231 (5th Dist. 1971), rev'd, 52 Ill. 2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455 (1972); Carolina Freight 
Carriers Corp. v. Local Union 61, 11 N.C. App. 159, 180 S.E.2d 461, cert. denied, 
278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 601 (1971); Ex parte Bryant, 155 Tex. 219, 485 S.W.2d 
719 (1956) . 
. 11. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967); County of Peoria v. 
Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 170-71, 265 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1970); Board of Junior College 
Dist. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418,427, 
262 N.E.2d 125, 129 (1st Dist. 1970); City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 
354-55, 230 N.E.2d 41, 48 (1st Dist. 1967). See also United States v. Dickinson, 465 
F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 
229, 334-35 (1917). 
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971 ). See also United States v. Hall, 472 
F.2d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1972); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of West 
Virginia, 442 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (1971) (semble); Backo v. Local 281, 438 F.2d 176, 
180 (1970); United States ex rei. Carter v. Jennings, 333 F. Supp. 1392, 1396 (E.D. 
Pa. 1971); In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (D. Ala. 1971); United States v. Puerto 
Rico Independence Party, 324 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1971); Sumbry v. Land 195 
S.E.2d 228, 234 (Ga. App. 1972); Riebe v. District Court, 184 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 
1971); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABoR INJUNCTION 123-25 (1930); Dobbs, 
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183,249-61 (1971). 
13. County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970); 
Board of Junior College Dist. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 
1600, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 998 
(1970); Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 
264 N.E.2d 18 (1970); City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 
(1st Dist.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1967). 
14. UMWA Union Hosp. v. UMWA Dist. 50, 1 Ill. App. 3d 822, 275 N.E.2d 231 
(5th Dist. 1971), rev'd, 52 Ill. 2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455 (1972); Board of Educ. v. 
Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 18 (1970). See 
also United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972). 
15. Tefft, Neither Above the Law nor Below It: A Note on Walker v. Birming-
ham, 1967 SUPREME CoURT REVIEW 181. 
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lateral bar rule, he may be convicted of contempt for acts which he had 
a legal right to perform without ever having an opportunity to litigate 
the underlying issues. 
The question of subject matter jurisdiction presents quite a dif-
ferent problem. The state constitution provides: "Circuit courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters,"16 and the legisla-
ture has provided that the circuit courts shall have power to grant 
writs of injunction.17 The circuit court ,thus has power or subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over cases where the plaintiff requests an injunction. 
Moreover, the power to decide a case includes the power to decide it 
incorrectly. It is irrelevant to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction 
whether the injunction was unconstitutional18 or erroneously issued in 
the face of the Anti-Injunction Act. 19 Thus, in accord with the col-
lateral bar rule, an injunction not meeting constitutional or statutory 
criteria ,could be expunged, while at the same time a contempt convic-
tion for breaching that erroneous injunction could be affirmed. 20 
According to the lliinois law, an injunction granted by a circuit 
court could be erroneous, but almost never void. The circuit court 
has power to grant injunctions and this includes the power to grant 
erroneous injunctions. The collateral bar rule precludes a defendant 
from breaching an injunction and then arguing error as a defense to 
contempt. The enjoined defendant's proper course is either to move 
to dissolve or modify the injunction, to appeal, or, if time is short, to 
request an expeditious stay of the injunction. 21 The rationale for this 
rule lies not in doctrine, but in policy. To allow an enjoined defendant 
to flout an injunction and then to argue against it in contempt is said 
to encourage disrespect for the courts because it allows the defendant 
to become judge in his own case. 22 Thus, when Frank Ditto announced 
his conscious intent to defy the court injunction, the issue was not 
whether the injunction was constitutional, but whether Ditto could con-
16. ILL. CoNST. art. 6, § 9. 
17. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 1 (1971). 
18. See generally Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 344-48; Monaghan, First Amend-
ment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 553 n.67 (1970). But see State ex rei. 
Superior Ct. v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69,73-78,483 P.2d 608,611-13 (1971). 
19. The Anti-Injunction Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 2(a) (1971 ), provides 
that no injunction or restraining order shall be granted in a case involving terms or 
conditions of employment. 
20. County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970). See 
generally Comment, Collateral Attack upon Labor Injunction Issued in Disregard of 
Anti-Injunction Statutes, 47 YALE L.J. 1136 (1937). 
21. Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 
264 N.E.2d 18 ( 1970); Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 362, 380. 
22. Board of Junior College Dist. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 
Local 1600, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125 (1st Dist. 1970) (citing Walker v. 
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)). See, e.g., United States v. Fidanian, 465 
F.2d 755, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 510 
(5th Cir. 1972). 
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sciously transgress the court decree. So also, in Cook County College 
Teachers, it was not incongruous for the circuit judge, after both the 
plaintiff and the state's attorney had rejected the opportunity to act 
upon contempt, to appoint another lawyer to charge and convict Nor-
man Swenson of contempt. 23 The court was .vindicating its own dig-
nity, integrity, and authority, and not furthering any interest of the 
parties. 
Because preserving respect for the court is the primary reason 
for the collateral bar rule, the rule should operate only in criminal 
contempt where the judgment is punative and intended to punish and 
preserve respect. In civil contempt the judgment is remedial or coer-
cive, and the contempt is usually said to rest upon the underlying de-
cree and to fall with it. 24 The distinction between civil and criminal 
contempt, unfortunately, is abstract rather than operational and has 
not worked very well in practice. 25 The already confused distinction 
between civil and criminal contempt has been exacerbated by the more 
recent cases. In UMW A Union Hospital, the circuit court found the 
contemnors to be in civil contempt, 26 but nevertheless levied fines. 
The fines could not have been coercive for the disobedience had ceased 
before the rule to show cause issued;27 and it seems clear that the fines, 
although denominated civil, were punative and criminal. 28 In Bene-
dict, 13 individual defendants were fined for criminal contempt, but 
the fines were to be suspended upon compliance with the permanent 
injunction. A determinate sentence, suspended upon the condition 
that the contemnor comply with the order, is coercive and blurs, if it 
does not extirpate, the distinction between civil-coercive and criminal-
punative contempt. 29 These cases and earlier decisions30 are unfortu-
nate because they confuse the distinction between civil' and criminal 
contempt, extend the collateral bar rule beyond the reasons for its 
existence, deter or prevent the courts from examjning the merits of 
contempt appeals, and distort the concepts of voidness and subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
23. See generally Halligan, Enjoining Public Employees' Strikes: Dealing with 
Recalcitrant Defendants, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 298, 299 (1969). 
24. The criminal-civil contempt distinction is made in College Teachers. See gen-
erally Dobbs, supra note 12, at 235-39, 243; United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258, 
294-95 (1947). 
25. Dobbs, supra note 12, at 246-47. See also, e.g., Emery Air Freight Corp. v. 
Teamsters Lo.cal 295, 449 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Carter v. 
Jennings, 333 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The same conduct can be both criminal 
and civil contempt. See Mitchell v. Fiore, 470 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1972); Hadnott v. 
Amos, 325 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
26. 1 Ill. App. 3d at 823, 275 N.E.2d at 232. 
27. Id. at 824, 275 N.E.2d at 233. 
28. See Dobbs, supra note 12, at 274-78. 
29. Id. at 244. 
30. Faris v. Faris, 35 III. 2d 305, 220 N.E.2d 210 ( 1966); County of Du Page v. 
Molitor, 26 III. App. 2d 232, 167 N.E.2d 592 (2d Dist. 1960). 
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Subject matter jurisdiction reveals the perpetual irony of the con-
flict between the romantic imagination and real life; and jurisdiction, 
the helpless abstraction, has been persistently manipulated in the proc-
ess of deciding particular cases. 31 Some federal cases illustrate this 
tendency. In United States v. United Mine Workers, 32 the union was 
held in contempt for ignoring an injunction. It contended that the 
injunction was void because the Norris-LaGuardia Ac~3 deprived the 
district court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the injunc-
tion was not void, but that even if it were void, the collateral bar rule 
would preclude relitigating injunction issues in the contempt proceed-
ing as long as jurisdiction were not frivolous. 34 The Mine Workers 
doctrine suffers from a lack of intelligibility,35 and has come in for 
some spirited criticism. 36 Another major case came in 1967 when the 
United States Supreme Court decided Walker v. City of Birmingham.31 
A group of black ministers paraded despite an ex parte injunction 
and were adjudged in contempt of court. The Alabama Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that if the enjoining court had a general grant 
of equity power and achieved jurisdiction over the persons enjoined, 
then the defendant who disobeyed the injunction is precluded from 
advancing injunction infirmities as a defense to contempt. 38 The United 
States Supreme Court held, in a divided opinion, that the Alabama 
rule was permissible state procedure, even in a constitutional case. 
Two qualifications were noted. If the "injunction was transparently 
invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity,"39 the defendant 
would be able to ignore it and argue its defects in a contempt hearing. 
The second qualification in Walker was practical and procedural rather 
than abstract. The ministers had not attempted to modify, dissolve, 
or appeal the injunction, but had called a press conference to denounce 
Alabama justice and marched in defiance of the injunction. "This 
case would arise in quite a different constitutional posture," the ma-
jority stated "if the petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had 
challenged it in the Alabama courts, and had been met with delay 
31. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 296-363. 
32. 330 u.s. 258 (1947). 
33. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any ... in-
junction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute." 29 U.S.C. § 104 
(1970). 
34. 330 U.S. at 309-10 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
35. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 376-77; C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CoURTS 
§ 16 (1970). 
36. Cox, The Void Order and the Duty To Obey, 16 U. Ciu. L. REv. 86 (1948); 
Watt, The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary, 14 id. 409 (1947). 
37. 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The case is superficially similar on the facts to King. 
Rev. Martin Luther King was a defendant to both injunctions, but a contemnor only 
in Walker. 
38. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1966). 
39.. 388 U.S. at 315. 
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or frustration of their constitutional claims. "40 This may be called 
the requirement of a timely challenge. The defendant, even though 
the injunction was secured ex parte, must first attempt a direct re-
view of the injunction. 41 Thus the pristine subject matter jurisdiction 
wall was breached on both sides: in Mine Workers, the Supreme 
Court held that there were some _void orders which must be obeyed; 
and in Walker, the court inferred that there were two classes of valid 
though erroneous orders which could be disobeyed with impunity. 
Before returning to subject matter jurisdiction in Illinois, it is well. 
to note one other development in the federal law of constitutional pro-
cedure. In Cdrroll v. Princess Anne, 42 the United States Supreme Court, 
on direct appeal, held unconstitutional an ex parte injunction against 
a National' State's Rights Party rally. In regulating protected expres-
sion, the Court reasoned, prior restraints are to be eschewed; and, 
to assure accuracy in the adjudicating process, if it is possible to give 
notice to the defendants before they are enjoined, the plaintiff must 
"invite or permit their participation in the proceedings. "43 The Car-
roll case has, however, proven to be easy to distinguish; and while the 
principle is commendable, in practice it has not protected many de-
fendants from ex parte injunctions. 44 The Illinois response was typical. 
In Kankakee Teachers, the temporary injunction to stop a strike in 
progress was granted ex parte and there was neither notice nor an at-
tempt to give notice, although the strikers were manning picket lines. 
The order was served, but the strike continued. Some of the strikers 
were convicted of contempt. Affirming, the Illinois Supreme Court 
distinguished Carroll as not applicable to picketing which is not dog-
matically equated with constitutionally protected speech, and as not 
binding precedent for an illegal strike which was in progress when 
enjoined. 45 The injunction procedure, moreover, was not even before 
40. /d. at 318. See on this point Judge Brown's opinion in United States v. 
Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972). 
41. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 385 (1970); 
Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1481, 1562 (1970); 
Brantigan, Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEo. L.J. 1513, 
1521 (1972); Cox, supra note 36, at 113; Rodgers, The Elusive Search for the Void 
Injunction: Res Judicata Principles in Criminal Contempt Proceedings, 49 B.U.L. 
REV. 251 (1969); Note, Collateral Attack of Injunction Restraining First Amendment 
Activity, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1097 (1972); Note, Injuria Non Excusat Injuriam.· 
Unconstitutional Injunctions and the Duty To Obey, 1970 WAsH. U.L.Q. 51. 
42. 393 u.s. 175 (1968). 
43. Id. at 180. The instances when notice need not be given are variously stated 
by the Court. Compare id. at 180 with id. at 182-83, and id. at 184-85. 
44. See, e.g., Duke v. Texas, 327 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Tex. 1971); Gov. Peterson, 
14 Ariz. App. 12, 480 P.2d 35 (1971); Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 
1970); Kleinjans v. Lombardi, 52 Hawaii 427, 478 P.2d 320 (1970); Mechanic v. 
Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. App. 1970). Contrast United Farm Workers Or-
ganizing Comm. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 556, 94 Cal. Rptr. 263, 483 P.2d 1215 
(1971); Commonwealth ex: rel. Costa v. Boley, 441 Pa. 495, 272 A.2d 905 (1971). 
45. 46 Ill. 2d at 444, 264 N.E.2d at 21. See Mims v. Duval County School Bd., 
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the contempt court-the contemnors were precluded by the collateral 
bar rule from advancing injunction issues .in the contempt proceeding. 46 
In other words, before Carroll will be applied, the defendant must 
have engaged in legal, pure speech, the injunction must have issued be-
fore the enjoined event, and the defendant must attack the injunction 
directly, by motion to dissolve or modify or by appeal. 
This was the law of Illinois as it stood before the fifth district 
appellate court decided Mine Workers Hospital. The rules relating to 
subject matter jurisdiction were simple and fairly clear; the courts ad-
hered to the collateral bar rule precluding relitigation of injunction is-
sues in contempt; the distinction between civil and criminal contempt 
was not always observed; and the collateral bar rule was, perhaps in-
correctly, applied to both criminal and civil. contempts. Mine Work-
ers Hospital was an appeal from an order holding a group of strikers 
in contempt for picketing in breach of a circuit court injunction. The 
appellate court held that the injunction was void because the circuit 
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and reversed the con-
tempt order. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court 
and affirmed the contempt. An analysis of the dialogue between the 
appeJtlate court and the Illinois Supreme Court provides a vehicle for 
examining the confusion of subject matter jurisdiction and collateral 
attack. 
The appellate court's first reason for reversing the contempt order 
was that because of the Anti-Injunction Act, the circuit court had no 
power to enjoin peaceful picketing in a legal labor dispute. 47 A literal 
reading of the decision would indicate that the appellate court believed 
the Act to be jurisdictional. If that is the intended meaning, it is, as 
the Illinois Supreme Court held, .incongruent with past cases. 48 The 
Illinois Supreme Court was right. 49 Injunctions which are granted but 
should not be granted are not void, but erroneous, and these injunc-
tions are not correctable by collateral attack in contempt. The Anti-
Injunction Act does not void a labor injunction that has been mis-
takenly granted. Had the legislature intended the Act to be jurisdic-
tional and an injunction to be void, it could have used either those 
words or their equivalents in order to override the jurisdiction of the 
circuit court which is clearly set out by statute and the state constitu-
tion. 50 The Act is intended to channel an inquiry, not to limit the juris-
diction of the courts. 
350 F. Supp. 553 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
46. 46 Ill. 2d at 445, 264 N.E.2d at 22. See also Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. 
Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
47. 1 Ill. App. 3d at 825-26, 275 N.E.2d at 233-34. 
48. 52 Ill. 2d at 501-02, 288 N.E.2d at 458. 
49. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2(a) (1971). 
50. ILL. CoNsT. art. 6, § 9; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 1 (1971 ). Cf. Z. CHAFEE, 
supra note 6, at 371. 
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Professor Chafee argued that the line between power and non-
power should be a bright line rather than tortured and obscure: A trial 
judge should be able to tell quickly and easily which cases belong in 
his court and which do not. This so-called "bright line policy" is in-
tended to prevent lengthy trials and difficult decisions which do not 
bind anyone; to prevent judges from refraining from deciding cases 
because of an excess of caution; and to prevent concentrating scarce 
judicial resources on jurisdictional issues rather than the merits of the 
casesY Jurisdictional questions should not turn on minor issues which 
involve many factors. Jurisdictional issues, moreover, should be able 
to be disposed of before the ·trial judge turns to the merits. It is waste-
ful to try the entire case and then decide that the court had no juris-
diction. 
[O]nly a strong demonstration of necessity can justify extending 
the list of defects of power so as to include errors which, by 
their very nature, often cannot be established satisfactorily until 
the trial of the merits has been going on for days and weeks. 
Power ought to be settled at the beginning of a suit. A 
horse should be disqualified before the race starts and not after 
a photo finish. 52 
The inquiry under the Anti-Injunction Act is complex and re-
quires evidence on the merits. OnJy peaceful picketing is protected; 
and the circuit court has power to enjoin mass picketing and violence. 53 
Only legal strikes are protected under the Act; and the circuit court has 
the power to enjoin illegal strikes. 54 When purpose or intent is at is-
sue, it is necessary to take evidence. 55 Must the court take evidence 
to decide whether the strike is legal or illegal, violent or nonviolent, 
the picketing is massed or informational, and, if it decides that the 
strike cannot be enjoined, decline jurisdiction? The circuit court from 
the outset either has jurisdiction or does not have it. Jurisdiction 
"never drops out of the sky into the middle of a case weeks after suit 
was begun."56 The limits on the injunctive power of the circuit court 
are not susceptible of easy determination at the outset, but rather re-
51. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 312. 
52. ld. at 317-18. 
53. Eads Coal Co. v. UMWA, Dist. 12, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1082, 269 N.E.2d 359 
(1971); Twin City Barge & Towing Co. v. Licensed Tugmen's & Pilots' Protective 
Ass'n of America, 48 Ill. App. 2d 1, 197 N.E.2d 749 (1st Dist. 1964); General 
Elec. Co. v. Local 997, UAW, 8 Ill. App. 2d 154, 130 N.E.2d 758 (3d Dist. 1955). 
54. Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (may 
enjoin strike by custodial employees of school district). Redding is explained some-
what in Peters v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 44 Ill. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 
(1969). See also School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 299 A.2d 441, 443 
(R.I. 1973) (may enjoin illegal strike). 
55. Cielesz v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 25 Ill. App. 2d 491, 167 
N.E.2d 302 (2d Dist. 1960); Simmons v. Retail Clerks Int'l, 5 Ill. App. 2d 429, 
125 N.E.2d 700 (4th Dist. 1955). 
56. Z. CHAFEE, SoME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 372 (1950). 
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quire the taking and weighing of evidence. Therefore, to assert that 
the Anti-Injunction Act is jurisdictional is to ignore the pr.actical reali-
ties and conceptual underpinning of the "bright line policy." Questions 
concerning which strikes are inside and which are outside the Act go 
to the merits of the individual case and affect erroneousness, but are 
not proper limits on subject matter jurisdiction. The appellate court 
was wrong in holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, and the Illinois Supreme Court correctly reversed. 
Another reason given by the appellate court for striking down the 
injunction was that it came under the exception in Walker v. Birming-
ham because it was "transparently on its face invalid."57 The Illinois 
Supreme Court dismissed this argument with the statement "we do not 
believe any such tr.ansparent invalidity was present in the case at 
bar."58 The Illinois Supreme Court was correct. The Walker opinion 
discussed when error of constitutional magnitude in an injunction could 
be collaterally asserted, and assumed that the court which had granted 
the injunction had jurisdiction or power. In Mine Workers Hospital, 
the appellate court held that the circuit court had no power to grant 
the injunction and then went on to assert transparent invalidity, a basis 
for allowing collateral attack, as a reason for lack of power in the issu-
ing court. If the appellate court was correct about jurisdiction, trans-
parent invalidity is superfluous. The circuit court either had jurisdic-
tion or it did not; and the seriousness of error has no bearing on the 
question of jurisdiction. The appellate court could have stated it in 
the alternative: the order was void but if the order was not void, then 
it was erroneous and this erroneousness was of sufficient magnitude 
(transparently invalid) to allow the error to be asserted on collateral 
attack. 
Even if "transparently invalid" is properly a reason for the result 
reached, it remains to determine whether the order was transparently 
invalid. In early November 1969, at the time of the injunction in Mine 
Workers Hospital, the law of Illinois was that strikes against nonprofit 
hospitals were illegal and could be enjoined;59 and it was not until more 
than three weeks after the operative facts in Mine Workers Hospital 
that the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and held that these strikes 
57. 1 Ill. App. 3d at 826-27, 275 N.E.2d at 234-35. The appellate court also 
found that exception in United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). This seems 
incorrect. The Walker case applied the collateral bar rule but stated that this barrier 
might be lowered if the injunction was transparently invalid. 388 U.S. at 315. United 
States v. UMW A held that an injunction must be obeyed, even though the issuing court 
had no jurisdiction, unless the asserted jurisdiction was "frivolous and not substantial." 
330 U.S. at 293. 
58. UMWA Union Hosp. v. UMWA Dist. 50, 52 Ill. 2d 496, 501, 288 N.E.2d 455, 
458 (1972). 
59. Peters v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 107 Ill. App. 2d 460, 264 N.R2d 
840 (1st Dist. 1969). 
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were legal and could not be enjoined.60 Moreover, the weaknesses 
which were said by the appellate court to raise the error in Mine Work-
ers Hospital to the level of transparent invalidity flowed from failure to 
give notice to the defendants when the injunction would constitute a 
prior restraint. 61 The Illinois Supreme Court had earlier recognized 
the difference between the rally in Carroll v. Princess Anne62 and pick-
eting, and held that Carroll only requires enhanced procedural protec-
tions in pure speech cases ,and not in speech plus picketing cases. 63 
The Illinois Supreme Court had also held that Carroll defects related 
to error and not jurisdiction, and were not of sufficient magnitude to 
be heard on collateral attack. 64 The appellate court holding and the 
Illinois Supreme Court reversal open up the problem of what exactly 
is meant by the term "transparently invalid" as an exception to the gen-
eral rule against collateral attack on injunctions. That the level of 
frivolous or transparent invalidity is somewhat above simple constitu-
tional error appears from the Walker case because there the injunction 
was unconstitutional in two respects: the ordinance which the injunc-
tion redacted was invalid on its face;65 and the injunction had been 
granted ex parte without the hearing later required by Carroll. Thus, 
while the Mine Workers Hospital injunction might have been erroneous, 
it is hard to say that it was transparently invalid. 
ill. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT LAW 
The injunction in Mine Workers Hospital was granted at 5:33 
a.m. No attempt was made to give notice to the pickets who were on 
the public sidewalks adjacent to the hospital. There was no hearing: 
the complaint was filed and the order was signed the same minute. 
The order forbade picketing and the strike. The picketing did not 
stop, and the picketers were chargee!. with contempt. 66 The evil, in 
this writer's opinion, is the ex parte injunction against peaceful picket-
60. Peters v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 44 Ill. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 
(1969). 
61. 1 Ill. App. 3d at 827, 275 N.E.2d at 235. 
62. 393 u.s. 175 (1968). 
63. Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264 
N.E.2d 18 (1970). See also United States Steelworkers v. Alabaster Line Co., 286 
Ala. 489, 242 So. 2d 658 (1970) (illegal picketing can be enjoined without a hearing 
if decree permits legal picketing); Go v. Peterson, 14 Ariz. App. 12, 480 P.2d 35 
(1971) (political speech in Carroll not analogous to movie theater); Kleinans v. 
Lombardi, 52 Hawaii 427, 478 P.2d 320 (1970) (Carroll inapplicable to conduct). 
64. Board of Educ. v.. Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 
264 N.E.2d 18 (1970). See also, e.g., United States v. Puerto Rico Independence 
Party, 324 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1971). 
65. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51, 153 (1969). When 
Walker was decided, the Alabama Court of Appeals had declared the ordinance un-
constitutional. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 43 Ala. App. 68, 180 So. 2d 114 (1965). 
66. 1 Ill. App. 3d at 824, 275 N.E.2d at 232-33. 
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ing. The appellate court's result, reversing contempt, is surely correct. 
What end could be served by punishing those strikers who picketed 
peacefully for a few hours? But, in order to release the strikers from 
contempt, the appellate court mercilessly tortured the doctrine of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court swaightened out 
the law of jurisdiction, but at the price of affirming a contempt order 
which should have been reversed. 
The appellate court's mistake is an example of what Chafee called 
judicial thinking on two levels. 67 On one level the appellate court asked 
elaborate, technical questions about the concept of subject matter juris-
diction. On the other level, the court asked a more basic question 
about the wise conduct of human affairs: Who should have the last 
word on the question of whether these pickets should be punished? 
It answered this question correctly. But, in order to reverse the pun-
ishment for contempt, the collateral bar rule required the appellate 
court to void the judgment. The order was voided in order to accom-
plish a wise practical result-freeing the strikers-but the concept of 
subject matter jurisdiction suffered. The Illinois Supreme Court af-
firmed the contempt and revealed more concern for consistent doctrine 
than compassion for the striking hospital workers. 
The solution Chafee advocated was a stay or supersedeas and a 
quick review. 68 This has also been suggested by the United States 
Supreme Court. 69 At times, an expeditious appeal or stay can provide 
relief from an incorrect or oppressive order.70 Sometimes, however, 
the enjoined conduct is in progress, 71 or the order is mandatory and 
requires affirmative conduct. Furthermore, a stay is not always 
granted; an appeal is time consuming and costly; a reversal may come 
too late to help the defendant; and, if the events which gave occasion 
to the conduct have passed, a reversal will often be a practical victory 
for the plaintiff. 72 Furthermore, to enjoin a strike is to break it, for 
time is of the essence and once the momentum is lost, the strike is 
over. 73 A stay or speedy review cannot be the full answer when the 
enjoined conduct is in progress or about to begin: ex parte procedure 
67. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 56, at 334-35 .. 
68. /d. at 358-63. 
69. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 319 n.12 (1967), cites Alabama 
Supreme Court Rule 47 which allows the court to accelerate filing dates for appellate 
papers., 
70. See, e.g., United States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 
1971); cf. Southeastern Prods. Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1972). 
71. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So .. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970). 
72. See, e.g., Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947); Kenyon v. City 
of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946). 
73. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 330 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting). See also School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 299 A.2d 441 (R.L 
1973); Watt, supra note 36. 
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combined with the collateral bar rule requires the defendant to cease 
or abandon his conduct at the price of contempt, even though the order 
may be incorrect. No matter how careful the appellate court is, 74 ex 
parte injunctions can and will create hardship for the defendant. 
New solutions must be sought. Discussion generally has bogged 
down in subject matter jurisdiction, 75 or concentrated on first amend-
ment problems. 76 The focus of inquiry, however, could be shifted from 
the first amendment and subject matter jurisdiction to jurisdiction over 
the person. The rest of this article will deal with the idea that many 
ex parte injunctions are void because the court lacks jurisdiction over 
the person of the defendants. 
Ex parte injunctions are interlocutory procedural devices designed 
to preserve the plaintiffs rights until a hearing can be scheduled. 77 An 
injunction is a conservative instrument which halts or prevents conduct. 
The stated purpose of the ex parte injunction or temporary restraining 
order is to preserve the status quo--"the last actual, peaceable, uncon-
tested status which preceded the controversy."7s In the rush of events, 
however, it is often difficult to identify the precise time the status quo 
existed. 
There are two related reasons for ex parte procedure in injunc-
tion cases. The first relates to certainty. The subject of the litigation 
must be preserved so that the court will have something to pass upon 
when the full hearing comes and so that the plaintiff will be able to 
enjoy the fruits of his victory. 79 The second relates to speed and se-
crecy. There is thought to be a class of defendants who, upon receipt 
of notice, may destroy, remove, or sell the subject of the litigation or 
otherwise render full relief impossible. so 
Ex parte practice in injunctions is ancient and almost universal. s1 
It has been approved by the United States Supreme Court,s2 and re-
spected commentators. sa There has also been criticism and it is felt 
74. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 310, 183 
N.E.2d 575 (1st Dist. 1962). See also United Steelworkers of America v. Seminole 
Asphalt Ref. Co., 269 So. 2d 28 (Fla. App. 1972). 
75. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 56, at 296-380. Cox, supra note 36. 
76. See, e.g., Note, 45 S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 41. 
77. See generally Nussbaum, Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary In-
junctions-The Federal Practice, 26 Sw. L.J. 265 (1972); Developments in the Law 
-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1055-61 (1965). 
78. Schlicksup Drug Co. v. Schlicksup, 129 Ill App. 2d 181, 187, 262 N.E.2d 713, 
716 (3d Dist. 1970). 
79. Developments in the Law, supra note 77. See also Nussbaum, supra note 77. 
80. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 126 (Fla. 1970). 
81. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABoR INJUNCTION 182 n.189 (1930). 
Early federal practice did not allow ex parte injunctions. /d. 
82. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968). 
83. See, e.g., Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REV. 
518, 537 (1970). 
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by many that some kind of notice is preferable to ex parte practice. 84 
There are two reasons for requiring notice. The first relates to the 
concept of status quo. There are times when orders are intended to 
end temporary emergencies rather than to lead to a hearing in the 
future. If the order succeeds in ending the temporary emergency, 
there will be no need for further proceedings. Ex parte procedure in 
emergencies is commonly used to suppress dissent, 85 and to break 
strikes. 86 It is argued, accordingly, that if the order does not lay the 
foundation for effective final relief, but is effective final relief, then 
the status quo rubric is inapposite and not very utilitarian. 87 In fact 
these orders are final orders. 88 
These ·final orders obtained ex parte and backed up by the col-
lateral bar rule create a superstructure which contains a latent but 
imposing potential for injustice, and the second reason for giving notice 
relates to this possibility. Justice Brennan has commented that ex parte 
injunctions were "obtained invisibly and upon a stage darkened lest it 
be open to scrutiny by those affected. "89 Ex parte procedure, by defi-
nition, excludes a hearing; the facts will be found from a sworn peti-
tion or affidavits. 90 Verification is the only guarantee of accuracy. 
Disinterested equanimity cannot be expected of plaintiffs; the request 
for an injunction will often be presented to the judge in a fashion which 
is at best one-sided because of the possibility of excessive zeal, mistake, 
selection, and omission. Ex parte procedure, therefore, creates an in-
centive for partisanship and chicanery. Allegations and affidavits are 
"a wholly untrustworthy class of proof."91 "It has long been recog-
nized that 'fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided deter-
mination of facts decisive of rights.' "92 Ex parte procedure frustrates 
84. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Transport Workers Union, 278 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1960); 
Arivida Corp. v. Sugarman, 259 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1958); Ford Motor Co. v. Cotting-
ham, Inc., 228 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1955); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers 
Ass'n, 299 A.2d 441 (R.I. 1973 ); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 81, 
at 224. 
85. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Walker v. City of Birming-
ham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
86. School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 299 A.2d 441 (R.I. 1973); 
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 81, at 63-65. 
87. State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (1971). 
Cf. Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
88. Rendleman, Legal Anatomy of an Air Pollution Emergency, 2 ENVIR. AFFAIRS 
90, 107-08 (1972); Note, S. CAL. L. REv., supra note 41, at 1088. 
89. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 346 (1967) (dissenting opin-
ion). 
90. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 60, § 3-1 (1971). 
91. Great Northern R.R. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 416 (D.N.D. 1923). See also 
Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Famters Organization, 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 
1971); United States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44, 46 (4th Cir. 1971); 
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7 (1966); 
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 81, at 65, 188-89. 
92. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). 
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the adversary system because in the absence of both parties there is a 
greater chance that the facts will be ascertained inaccurately, the law 
will be applied incorrectly, and the order will be drafted incautiously. 
These reasons, which relate to accuracy in the litigation process, may 
be termed pragmatic reasons to oppose ex parte procedure. 
There are also a priori reasons to avoid ex parte procedure. In a 
democracy, the state exists to promote the welfare of individuals and 
the emphasis is upon private decisionmaking, unfettered by government 
interference. 93 It seems fundamental to a democracy that people who 
are affected by a decision should participate in making it. If a person 
is ordered to cease conduct by an injunction thrust upon him as an 
accomplished fact, it appears to be government by fiat. 94 He has had 
no opportunity to participate in the process which curtailed his con-
duct; and even if the order is correct under law, it is odious and un-
palatable because of the way it came about,95 and it is likely to cause 
resentment toward the decision, the decisionmakers, and the decision-
making process. This bitter and disaffected reaction to ex parte pro-
cedure relates to the principle of legitimation: Decisions will be more 
readily complied with if both sides have had ample opportunity to state 
their position and persuade others to adopt it. 96 The judicial process 
has a symbolic function. Professor Paul Carrington has observed that 
the decisionmaking process is "a ritual which celebrates our common 
concern for the right of each individual to insist that official decisions 
affecting him be made subject to general principles of humane quality 
93. "[11he prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of 
law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political history, that 
we pla.ce on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference." 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972); cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 
(1971); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
94. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1832 (3d ed. 1940); Dobbs, Contempt of Court: 
A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REV. 183, 250 (1971). 
95. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (1965). See also F. FRANKFURTER & N. 
GREENE, supra note 81, at 52-53; Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Pro-
cedure I, 18 ILL. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1923); Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that Are 
Civilized To Promote Justice that Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1971). It might 
be argued that defendants are more aggravated by the fact of the injunction than the 
method of securing it. Some of the anger at having been had is no doubt due to the 
fact of the injunction, but it is reasonable to conclude that ex parte procedure exacer-
bates the outrage. See Rendleman, supra note 88, at 103-04. 
96. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 
(1966). The legitimation concept is related to the political science concept of legiti· 
macy which "involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the be· 
lief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the soci-
ety." . S. LIPSET, PoLITICAL MAN 64 (1963). Access to decisionmaking institutions 
seems to be basic to a feeling that the institutions are legitimate ones. Id. at 65, 67. 
That notions of illegitimacy may stem from denial of access to decisions is relevant to 
a study of ex parte injunctions is almost too obvious to state. Lipset couples the sym. 
bollc value of legitimacy with the instrumental value of effectiveness which relates to 
how things work. Id. at 64. Lipset's legitimacy-effectiveness analysis is close to the 
priori-pragmatic analysis discussed herein. 
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enforced by high officials personally familiar with his problem."97 
When the adversary process is short circuited at the outset, these values 
are frustrated. On the other hand, in a judicial proceeding where both 
sides are allowed a full opportunity to present a case there is a better 
chance that the loser will think that an adverse result, even though not 
to his liking, is a legitimate decision. 
In deciding whether there is a need for an adversary presentation, 
therefore, it is necessary to consider both the accuracy of the adjudicat-
ing process and the impact on those who would be required to submit 
to a decision which they had no part in shaping. Full publicity is the 
best guarantee against abuse; a result following full publicity will be 
both a more accurate decision and one more easily accepted by the 
loser. 
The policy reasons underlying the collateral bar doctrine are pre-
serving respect for the courts, preventing defendants from appointing 
themselves judge in their own cases, and resolving disputes in a neutral 
forum rather than upon the initiative of private and interested parties. 
There is surely something to preserving respect, and the system runs 
better if some wisdom is presumed in judges-it reinforces the judges 
and reassures the rest of us. Respect for the courts, however, should 
not be allowed to degenerate into a complacent belief that the person-
nel of our court system possess intelligence approaching omniscience. 
Some who support ex parte practice impute an almost supernat-
ural quality to the judicial function. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in 
a decision that defendants must obey orders which the judge had no 
power to grant, 98 stated: 
The conception of a government by laws dominated the thoughts 
of those who founded this Nation and designed its Constitution, 
although they knew as well as the belittlers of the conception that 
laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by men. To 
that end, they set apart a body of men, who were to be the de-
positories of law, who by their disciplined training and character 
and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private interest 
may reasonably be expected to be "as free, impartial, and in-
dependent as the lot of humanity will admit." So strongly were 
the framers of the Constitution bent on securing a reign of law 
that they endowed the judicial office with extraordinary safe-
guards ,and prestige. No one, no matter how exalted his public 
office or how righteous his private motive, can be judge in his 
own case. That is what courts are for. 99 
97. ABA Proceedings, Improving Procedures in the Decisional Process, 52 F.R.D. 
51, 78 (1971 ). 
98. United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258, 310-12 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).. Contrast Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252,289 (1941). 
99. 330 U.S. at 308-09. 
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Many disagree and reject the idea that judges are something more 
than normal people. Professor Richard Watt, commenting on United 
States v. United Mine Workers and Justice Frankfurter's encomium to 
judges, stated: 
The history of the assumption and usurpation of power by 
the judiciary in America is a familiar story. But this doctrine, 
. . . is as flagrant an instance as our constitutional history pro-
vides. . . . The flavor of long-discarded divine right which 
has lingered around the concept of contempt has finally emerged 
as a doctrine--the doctrine that the Court can do no wrong.100 
Judges, in his view, should receive no more respect than they earn. 
As the Mississippi Supreme Court recently observed: "Respect for 
courts is that voluntary esteem the public has for judicial rectitude. 
Punishment for contempt will not insure or preserve respect, for it 
cannot be compelled."101 Thus, insisting that allowing disobedience 
of incorrect orders encourages disrespect for correct orders and 
requiring that incorrect decrees be obeyed without possibility of chal-
lenge may diminish rather than preserve respect for the courts.102 The 
collateral bar rule, it has been charged, requires misplaced respect for 
the person of the judge who may be wrong, while the proper respect 
is to some higher law.103 The defendant-contemnors in many of the 
collateral bar cases have been opponents of the existing order, ex-
ponents of social change, and authors of social ferment. 104 The plain-
tiffs, on the other hand, have been the voice of order and continuity; 
their desire is to preserve the status quo. The defendant groups can-
not be expected to pay the same obeisance to judges, courts, or court 
orders as the plaintiff groups. No prefabricated formula, in the view 
of the defendants, should be allowed to impede social change or to pre-
vent the courts from deciding issues on the merits. 
The emphasis to be placed upon preserving the status quo and 
100. Watt, The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 409, 
448 (1947). 
101. Boydstun v. State, 259 So. 2d 707, 709 (Miss. 1972). 
102. T. EMERSON, lim SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 384, 385 (1970); 
Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARv. L. REv. 626, 635 (1970). 
103. See the arguments of the ministers in Walker, 388 U.S. at 323-24; and of 
Frank Ditto in King, 86 Ill. App. 2d at 348, 230 N.E.2d at 45 (1967). 
104. See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 102, at 286-90. Union president and 
civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph put it this way: 
"Demonstrations are the hallmark of every revolution since the birth of ~iviliza­
tion. . . . These are the outbursts, . . . the manifestations of deep convictions 
about the evils that people suffer. While they sometimes take the form of some irra-
tional upsurge of emotionalism, they come from the fact that the peoples are the vic-
tims of long-accumulated wrongs and deprivations. Therefore, these are an outburst 
and an outcry for justice, for freedom. And there is no way . . . to stop these demon-
strations until the cause is removed, and the cause is racial bias, the cause is exploita-
tion and oppression, the cause is a second-:Class citizen in a first-class nation. . . . 
This is the reason for the civil rights revolution." Quoted in J. Anderson, Profiles 
(A. Philip Randolph lli), New Yorker, Dec. 16, 1972, at 40, 73-74. 
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maintaining respect for the courts is a matter of ideology and the ques-
tion is not so simple as whether respect can be purchased with depri-
vation. The order or decree of the court is presumptively correct until 
dissolved, modified, or overruled on appeal. Obedience, therefore, is 
required. One who would contest the constitutionality of a criminal 
statute is, however, not precluded from doing so following a violation.105 
Thus the collateral bar rule is an anomaly in the law.106 Chief Judge 
John Brown of the Fifth Circuit offers pragmatic and institutional rea-
sons for distinguishing obedience to statutes from obedience to judicial 
decrees: 
The problem is unique to the judiciary because of its particular 
role. Disobedience to a legislative pronouncement in no way 
interferes with the legislature's ability to discharge its responsi-
bilities (passing laws). The dispute is simply pursued in the 
judiciary and the legislature is ordinarily free to continue its func-
tion unencumbered by any burdens resulting from the disregard 
of its directives. . . . 
On the other hand, the deliberate refusal to obey an order 
of the court without testing its validity through established proc-
esses requires further action by the judiciary, and therefore di-
rectly affects the judiciary's ability to discharge its duties and 
responsibilities. Therefore, "while it is sparingly to be used, yet 
the power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and 
integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is ab-
solutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on 
them by law. Without it they are mere boards of arbitration 
whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory."107 
The collateral bar rule should be used only when required by the rea-
sons ,asserted in support of it; it should be relaxed when countervailing 
interests of sufficient weight are interposed. 108 
An interest which must be considered is the value of litigating is-
sues on the merits. To command respect, court orders should be adju-
dicated in a procedural process which will allow them to be worthy of 
respect. Respect for court orders is marginal in ex parte procedure. 
First, the order is more likely to be defective. The court has heard 
only one side before finding facts, applying the law, .and formulating 
the order. Second, the injunction is the product of an atmosphere 
105. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 327 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting). In fact, he might be required to violate the criminal statute to test its con-
stitutionality. See, e.g., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 17 (1971); Becker v. Thompson, 
459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972). 
106. See generally Note, supra note 105. See also United States v. Fidanian, 465 
F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1972); accord, Mitchell v.. Fiore, 470 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1972). 
107. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 510 (5th Cir. 1972). 
108. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971). Also note the result in United 
States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1972). But see the Dickinson 
case on remand, 349 F. Supp. 227 (D. La. 1972). 
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which might seem to be one of subterranean intrigue and is thrust 
upon the defendant like a fiat. The defendant has had no opportunity 
to participate in the adjudicating process and may justifiably feel over-
reached. Defendants in injunction suits should be treated not only with 
fairness, but with the assiduous appearance of fairness. Ex parte pro-
cedure only exacerbates their estrangement from constituted authority. 
IV. A PROPOSAL: NOTICE AND HEARING 
This ,article has examined the reasons for ex parte practice and 
the policy behind the collateral bar rule. When considered in relation 
to democratic values and the goals of our procedural system, both the 
collateral bar rule and ex parte practice were found guilty of excesses 
and held capable of creating serious injustice. The need is to construct 
a doctrinal mechanism which will allow the courts to function yet not 
require obedience to court orders which are unworthy of respect. The 
article turns next to the recent due process cases which have brought 
the propriety of ex parte injunction procedure out of the region of 
generalities and into one where decisions are inevitable. It will be ar-
gued that all injunctions and orders with practical finality must be 
preceded by notice and a hearing or else be void. 
Defendants to an ex parte injunction do not have an adequate inter-
est to impose the dictates of due process, it could be argued, because 
the order is not final and is subject to a motion to dissolve or modify. 
This argument was considered in Fuentes v. Shevin/09 which con-
cerned summary prejudgment repossession of household chattels pur-
chased by time payments. The Supreme Court held that even though 
the repossession was not final, the purchaser's interest was not vitiated 
because his bare possessory interests in the chattels were enough to call 
due process onto the field before the chattels were taken. The Court 
observed that even a temporary deprivation of property falls under the 
fourteenth amendment. 110 In the illinois cases here considered, the 
defendants' property interests were not hampered. Instead, the injunc-
tions circumscribed the defendants' liberty interests: their freedom to 
locomote, to exhort, to inform, and to apply economic and other pres-
sure. These interests in conduct or liberty would seem to he equally pro-
tected by the due process guarantees. In addition, it is clear that when 
a court issues an order which prohibits conduct already in progress, 
the order has practical finality. The defendant must alter his plans 
to conform his conduct to the order or pay the price of contempt. 
Time is a perishable commodity; in a strike or a demonstration, timing 
109. 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
110. Id. at 85. See also Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., ~oncurring); Pervis v. LaMarque Independent School Dist., 446 F.2d 1054 
(5th Cir. 1972). 
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and momentum are particularly vital. If nothing happens, the status 
quo can, from the plaintiffs position, be said to have been preserved. 
But if conduct in progress is stopped or if planned conduct is pre-
vented, then, from the defendant's vantage point, the status quo has 
been modified and his conduct has been restricted .and hampered. In 
injunction cases, the due process guarantees should be held to attach 
when the defendant's interest in his conduct is such that the order or 
injunction has practical finality. 
Problems which arise in deciding whether an injunction or order 
has practical finality could be partially solved by looking to the cases 
which determine whether an order is sufficiently final to be appeal-
able.111 The key to the inquiry is whether the order affects the de-
fendant's interest in his present conduct. Any order which deters or 
inhibits the defendant's interest in his present conduct is a decision 
on the merits as to that conduct and has practical finality. 112 An or-
lll. Construction Laborers, Local No. 438 v. S.J. Curry & Co., 371 U.S. 542, 
550 (1963); Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Wood, 
295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961). See generally C. WRIGliT, FEDERAL CoURTS §§ 101, 
102 (1970); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 403 (1968); Annot., 19 id. 459. 
Ex parte orders have frequently been held unappealable. See Annot., 19 A.L.R. 
3d at 439-44, 480-83. This factor, however, is not relevant to the question of whether 
the order has practical finality because in determining practical finality the question is 
whether the order affects significant interests and hence should not be ex parte. 
112. Some understanding of the admittedly imprecise concept of practical finality 
can be attained by comparing two recent ex parte theatre-obscenity injunctions. In 
State v. Gulf States Theatres, 270 So. 2d 547 (La. 1972), on the basis of a sworn 
statement of facts in a petition, the judge enjoined, pending a hearing, the showing of 
the motion picture. This order had practical finality. The theatre could not exhibit 
the picture at all pending the first adversary hearing five days later. Nothing hap-
pened and, in that sense, the status quo was preserved, but as to the defendants, the 
order was final for five days and the order was permanent for the same time. The ma-
jority, however, observed incorrectly that the order was temporary and to preserve the 
status quo. 270 So. 2d at 552, 554-55 (McCabb, C.J., concurring). The dissents 
are persuasive. 270 So. 2d at 555-60, 562-78. See especially Justice Barham's dis-
cussion on ex parte procedure in a civil obscenity case. ld. at 568-70. On the 
other hand, in United States v. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. 
Fla. 1971), the government scheduled a hearing on whether a search warrant should 
be issued. In the meantime, because the theatre management was aware of possible 
trouble, an ex parte order was obtained. The order restrained "all interested parties 
from 'disposing of, relinquishing possession of, or in any manner cutting, altering, 
splicing, destroying or mutilating subject motion picture ''Turned on Girl" ... .'" 
ld. at 120. This order did not have practical finality for it did not deter present or 
planned conduct. Nor did the order interfere with expression in any meaningful sense. 
To the contrary, the de.cree insured that if showings of the movie continued, expression 
would continue unabated. Thus the principle of Carroll v. Princess Anne was not 
violated. The preliminary order, accordingly, preserved the subject of litigation for 
the court to pass upon since the court could hardly decide obscenity if the question-
able segments of the print were in the projectionists' wastebasket. 
So conceived, the practical finality concept is similar to the Solicitor General's ar-
gument in Walker v. City of Birmingham that the Supreme Court should not apply the 
collateral bar rule but instead consider the merits because the injunction therein did 
not preserve the status quo. Selig, Regulation of Street Demonstrators by Injunction, 
4 HARv. CIV. R.Ioms-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 135, 150 (1968). 
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der with practical finality impairs a substantial right of the defendant, 
and that is enough of an interest to call the due process guarantees into 
operation. 
If the defendant has a sufficient interest to give rise to due process 
protection, then the question must be: what sort of procedure does 
due process require before an injunction with practical finality is 
granted? Due process is a concept which varies in relation to the par-
ticular set of interests at stake.113 Notice and a hearing in advance 
of an adjudication which may affect defendant's rights are core values 
in our adversary system and have been said to be the very essence of 
procedural due process.114 The defendant should have notice, and he 
should receive it far enough in advance to allow him to prepare.115 
Practical problems may arise, and flexibility must be considered as 
well a.S the plaintiff's need for haste. The Constitution requires no 
more than "notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections,"116 and the plaintiff 
must, in any event, inform the defendant of the accomplished fact of 
the injunction in order to bind him. In many cases telephonic notice 
to the attorney for the adverse party should be enough. 117 The consti-
tutional issues do not turn on formalities but revolve around fairness118 
and actual notice. 119 The plaintiff should give notice as soon as he 
can and not just before he leaves for the courthouse or the judge's 
home. 
There are, it could be argued, countervailing interests sufficient to 
outweigh the need for notice. The plaintiff, arguably, has a need for 
speed and efficiency and in many ex parte cases a desire to prevent 
the defendant from destroying or concealing the subject property. 
These arguments, however, were considered in the context of summary 
·repossession and rejected. The due process clause was "designed to 
113. Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Bronson v. 
Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Colligan v. United 
States, 349 F. Supp. 1233 (B.D. Mich. 1972); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 
(B.D. Wis. 1972). 
114. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); F. JAMES, 
QVIL PROCEDURE § 12.1 (1965). 
115. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). · 
116. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See also 
Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
117. Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendments to Rule 65(b), 39 F.R.D. 
124-25 (1966). FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2) requires the plaintifrs attorney to make a 
record of what he has done to give notice. 
118. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Nowell v. 
Nowell, 384 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1967). 
119. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); Weaver v. O'Grady, 350 F. Supp. 
403 (S.D. Ohio 1972). 
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protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing 
concern for efficiency and efficacy which may characterize praise-
worthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre 
ones."120 In dealing with the need for prompt action to prevent the 
debtor from destroying or concealing the goods, the Supreme Court 
observed that the statutes were too broad to encompass that purpose 
and that "no such unusual situation is presented by the facts of these 
cases."121 An allegation of immediate and irreparable injury is neces-
sary for ,an ex parte temporary restraining order.122 Nevertheless, in 
the absence of an adversary process, there is no realistic check on the 
truth of the allegations; and the state has abandoned effective control 
over private use of state power and "acts largely in the dark."123 That 
a quick motion to dissolve or modify is available124 could be argued 
to obviate the need for notice in advance. But it must be remembered 
that we are dealing with conduct in progress or about to begin. The 
order binds the defendant from the time he has actual knowledge of 
it; and if the order has practical finality, the reasoning in Justice Har-
lan's concurrence in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 125 should con-
trol: "I think that due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' 
and 'hearing' which ,are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least 
the probable validity, of the underlying claim ... before [defendant] 
can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use." 
Notice, it could also be argued, is obviated because, if the injunc-
tion is improper, the defendant may recover on the bond. This argu-
ment must also be rejected. First, the government which has been 
the litigant in many of these cases is not required to post security, 126 
and any remedy against the bond is generally held to be the exclusive 
remedy.127 Even where the plaintiff is a private party the argument 
for recovery on the bond must be repudiated. To allow a plaintiff to 
post bond and prevent a defendant's conduct at the cost of later paying 
damages is to allow a plaintiff to buy up the defendant's right to lib-
erty. "[N]o later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact 
120. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
u.s. 645,656 (1972)). 
121. 407 U.S. at 93. 
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); 
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 29 Cal. App. 3d 681, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1972). 
123. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972). But see Chrysler Credit Corp. v. 
Waegele, 29 Cal. App. 3d 681, 686, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914, 917 (1972). 
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971) (2 days or less). 
125. 395 u.s. 337, 343 (1969). 
126. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 9 (1971). See also FED. R. Clv. P. 65(c). 
127. Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mass. 
1966); Alabama Mills v. Mitchell, 159 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C. 1958); Monolith Port-
land Midwest Co. v. Re.construction Fin. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1955); 
Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARv. L. REV. 333 
(1959). 
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that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due 
process has already occurred." "[The bond] is no replacement for 
the right to a prior hearing that is the only truly effective safeguard 
against arbitrary deprivation of property."128 Plaintiffs should not be 
allowed to enjoin now and pay later. 
Thus, it is clear that notice should be required before granting an 
injunction which has practical finality. The purpose of notice, of 
course, is to allow the defendant to participate in the process of adju-
dicating the issues;129 and the notice should inform the defendant of 
the basis of the plaintiffs charges, the relief asked, and the time and 
place of the hearing. The manner and style of the hearing may vary 
with the interests at stake and the time available. 130 If defendant's 
constitutional rights are at issue, a more rigorous hearing might be re-
quired.131 If the event sought to be enjoined is in progress, perhaps a 
less formal hearing may be permissible.132 The hearing should be the 
best the circumstances allow and provide some guar,antee of the truth 
of the plaintiffs assertions, the correctness of the law applied, and, 
if an order is necessary, some assurance that the order be tailored to 
the legitimate interests of both sides.133 The hearing or adjudicative 
process must not be a farce134 but must provide a real test. 135 In Fu-
entes, the United States Supreme Court condemned a process in which 
the creditor alleged his conclusions on a form and posted a bond be-
fore the writ which allowed him to take possession was issued by a 
nonjudicial state official. Ex parte injunction practice is somewhat 
different: the plaintiff must proceed upon affidavit or verified com-
plaint charging specific facts which give rise to immediate and irrepa-
rable loss.136 The injunction will be granted by a judge; .and, if the 
government is the plaintiff, no bond is required.137 The pr:actical dif-
128. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1972). See also Gross v. Fox, 349 
F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
129. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. Na-
tional Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971); Consolidation Coal Co. 
v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1971); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
130. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 & n.21 (1972). 
131. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstra-
tions, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1481 (1970). 
132. "[D]ue process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing 'appropriate to 
the nature of the case.'" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972). 
133. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 179, 182-84 (1968). See also State ex rel. 
Matalik v. Schubert, 204 N.W.2d 13 (Wis. 1973). 
134. Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d 
353 (5th Cir.1971). 
135. See the discussion of the nature of the hearing required and the standard of 
proof in Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 89-91 (1972). 
136. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971). See People ex rei. Scott v. Aluminum 
Coil Anodizing Corp., 132 Ill. App. 2d 168, 268 N.E.2d 53 (2d Dist. 1971). 
137. ILL. REv:. STAT. ch. 69, § 9 (1971). 
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ferences may not, however, be always that great. The allegations, even 
if sworn, prove only the strength of the applicant's own belief in his 
rights.138 Since there are forms available for ex parte injunctions, the 
drafting process may be no more than filling in blanks. The adjudica-
tive role of the judge is frequently attenuated, and the injunction may 
be granted almost automatically. The underlying reality is the ab-
sence of a right to be heard. An adversary hearing, it has been said, 
is the constitutional norm. 139 If the process does not provide any real-
istic check on the self interest of the plaintiff, the title of the official 
who is purported to act for the state should not affect the right to a 
hearing.140 Sworn oral testimony which is subject to cross examina-
tion should be preferred141 and in some cases may be necessary.142 
"[WJhen a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, 
and when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively 
unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be 
prevented. "143 
There are good arguments for requiring notice for all injunctions 
with practical finality and holding that failure to give proper notice 
deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant who may 
ignore the order and prove lack of personal jurisdiction in any subse-
quent proceeding. The ex parte injunction is not fully worthy of re-
spect. It is formulated in a process which calls both its accuracy and 
its legitimacy into question. A jurisdictional requirement for notice 
before granting injunctions with practical finality will surmount the 
collateral bar rule in ex parte cases where it should not apply and pre-
serve it to operate within its proper scope in fully litigated cases where 
it should ,apply. Because an ex parte injunction with practical fi-
nality would be void, there would be no need for the defendant to 
hasten to the courthouse to interpose a timely challenge. Therefore, 
as a practical matter, plaintiffs will give notice. Requiring notice will 
allow the adversary system to function, decrease the number of over-
reaching injunctions, and enhance the legitimacy of the adjudicating 
process and the court system. The plaintiff will be deprived of an 
opportunity to act speedily and secretly but if successful, will attain 
the moral force of a decision on the merits. The court will decide 
cases more on the real issues and less on a one-sided presentation. 
138. In Fuentes the Court observed that the ex parte procedure may even provide 
an incentive to state facts incorrectly. 407 U.S. at 83 n.13. 
139. Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources, 325 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 
(N.D. Cal. 1970). 
140. Cf. Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762, 766 (D. W. Va. 1972). But see 
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 29 Cal. App. 3d 681, 687, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914, 917 
(1972). 
141. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
142. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Cf. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 
(E.D. Wis. 1972). 
143. 407 U.S. at 81. 
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The proposed jurisdictional requirement for notice ,and hearing 
for injunctions with practical finality rests on lines of cases: the 
Carroll case and other cases which require enhanced procedural 
protection before controlling expression-related conduct with an 
injunction; the due process cases which require notice and a hearing 
when a constitutionally cognizable interest is affected by state action 
or adjudication; and the line of constitutional cases which void a judg-
ment which was issued without notice. 144 The notice requirement in 
Carroll would be expanded by the interest concept of the due process 
cases from a narrow group of first amendment cases to include all in-
junctions which have practical finality. And, because of the collateral 
bar rule in injunction cases, the due process-notice rules must be juris-
dictional rather than erroneous to carry out their purpose. illinois al-
ready has the beginning of a practical finality-personal jurisdiction rule. 
There are cases which hold that if notice should have been given but 
was not, an injunction will be reversed for that reason ,alone without 
inquiring further.U 5 All that would be required is to solidify the point 
at which notice is required at practical finality and to apply a juris-
dictional or voiding analysis when notice is not given. 
Jurisdiction and due process are highly ambiguous terms. They 
are recondite abstractions which must be applied in a myriad of prac-
tical situations. They describe a variety of legal rules, 'and their mean-
ings change with time and the context. The general problem consid-
ered here is the need, while preserving respect for the court, for rapid 
relief from oppressive decrees. The barrier has been the collateral 
bar rule. Jurisdiction of the court, while a useful concept, is over-
doctrinal and out of touch with the underlying procederal reality and, 
therefore, a capricious variable to allow an escape from the harsh dic-
tates of the collateral bar rule. One who considers the changes in due 
process in the last 10 years is struck with one feature. More emphasis 
is placed upon fairness and procedural protection for a variety of inter-
ests and the trend is decidedly away from ex parte and summary pro-
cedure.146 As the courts, by the use of due process, have extended 
and expanded the ,adversary principle into spheres which had previ-
ously escaped its influence, many ancient redoubts which were once 
considered unassailable have precipitately crumbled.147 
144. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Polansky v. 
Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
145. Schaefer v. Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 575 
(1st Dist. 1962). Illinois also has cases which take up the problem of when notice is 
unnecessary. These cases include UMWA Union Hosp. (S. Ct.), and General Elec. 
Co. v. Local 997, UAW, 8 III. App. 2d 154, 130 N.E.2d 758 (3d Dist. 1955). 
146. See, e.g., Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Colligan v. 
United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. 
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
147. See, e.g., Veterans of Abraham Lin.coln Brigade v. Attorney General, 470 
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The collateral bar rule should not be a formula to be universally 
and unthinkingly applied. A question which may reasonably be asked 
to limit the scope of the collateral bar rule is whether the injunction 
was formulated in a process which provides some guarantee of accuracy 
and legitimacy. If the Draconian operation of the collater·al bar rule 
is to be restricted, the due process cases provide a f:r;ame of reference 
with a reasonable relation to the policies sought to be advanced. A 
due process rule which requires, at the cost of personal jurisdiction, 
such notice ·and a hearing as are practical under the circumstances be-
fore granting an injunction with practical finality, limits the collateral 
bar rule with proper regard to those variables. Yet the analysis sug-
gested here in no way invalidates the collatefal bar rule and does not 
consign it to the limbo reserved for trivialities but preserves it, some-
what shorn, to operate within its proper sphere. 
V. A REEVALUATION OF THE ILLINOIS CASES 
In City of Chicago v. King a hearing was held before the court 
gfanted the injunction which required demonstrators to inform the po-
lice before demonstrating. Contemnor Ditto was present at the hearing 
and made no objection thereto. 148 Three days later Ditto called a 
press conference and announced his intent to defy the injunction. The 
injunction was then served on Ditto who nevertheless demonstrated in 
defiance of it. 
In Ditto's contempt hearing, the collateral bar rule was properly 
applied to preclude, as a defense to contempt, arguments that the in-
junction was unconstitutionally void. The injunction did not have 
practical finality for the August 22 demonstration does not even seem 
to have been planned when the injunction was granted on August 
19th. If respect for the courts is to have any meaning, it must mean 
that ligitated decisions should be obeyed pending dissolution, modifi-
cation, or review. 149 Instead of calling a press conference to denounce 
the court and the injunction, Frank Ditto should have made a motion 
to dissolve150 or mcdify the assertedly unconstitutional injunction. 
In Cook Cvunty College Teachers a tempo:r:ary injunction against 
a strike was granted on November 30. A strike was called that day 
F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
148. 86 Ill. App. 2d at 347, 230 N.E.2d at 44. 
149. It could be argued that the emergency obviated the need for notice. The 
writer, however, thinks notice should be required. See The Supreme Court, 
1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 88-89 (1972); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 
1334, 1337-38 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 
448 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 110 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Les-
sard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972); C. v. Superior Court, 
29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1973). 
150. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 15 (1971). 
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and picketing began the next. Contemnor Swenson knew of the in-
junction when he spoke at·the meeting on November 30 and later pick-
eted in breach of the injunction. After the strike was settled, the plain-
tiff moved to dissolve the injunction and disdained to press contempt 
charges against Swenson·. The circuit judge requested the state's at-
torney to bring contempt but that office declined and eventually a mem-
ber of the bar was appointed to investigate. Swenson was charged 
with contempt and the collateral bar rule was applied.151 
There may or may not have been notice and an adversary hear-
ing; the order was titled a temporary injunction which should, but need 
not always follow notice;152 and the reported case does not indicate 
whether there was notice.153 If there was notice and an opportunity 
to present matter at the hearing, then the collater:al bar rule was prop-
erly applied. If, on the other hand, there w,as neither notice nor op-
portunity to present defenses at an adversary hearing, the question is 
whether the injunction had practical finality. If an injunction with 
practical finality was granted without notice, then, following the analy-
sis suggested here, the court did not obtain personal jurisdiction, the in-
junction was void, and Swenson could show the voidness to defeat 
contempt. This would be true even though the plaintiff was entitled 
to .an injunction against an illegal strike, 154 'and the defendant-con-
temnor knew of the injunction. The purpose of the practical finality-
personal jurisdiction analysis is to require adversary adjudications be-
fore an injunction is granted; the clarity of the law might lead to an 
attenuated hearing, but not to no hearing at all, and actual knowledge 
after the injunction is granted is not legal notice before the hearing. 155 
The exact time sequence does not appear in the reported opin-
ion;156 and whether the injunction had practical finality cannot be 
stated with any certainty. The issue is whether, the defendants being 
available for notice, the injunction proscribed, circumscribed, or ma-
terially affected either conduct in progress or conduct which was so 
imminent that the injunction would prevent or alter the conduct before 
there was a reasonable and practical chance to modify or dissolve it. 
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the injunction had practical fi-
nality and could only issue upon notice and some kind of adversary 
151. 126 Ill. App. 2d at 426, 262 N.E.2d at 128. 
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3 (1971). 
153. 126 Ill. App. 2d at 424, 262 N.E.2d at 127. 
154. Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965). 
155. Cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). If the injunction was granted 
following notice to the union and a hearing was held although Swenson was not noti-
fied to be present, and the injunction read so as to bind the defendant's officers, and 
Swenson had actual knowledge of the injunction before he violated it, then the collateral 
bar rule could be properly applied. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971); Dobbs, 
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183 (1971 ). 
156. 126 Ill. App. 2d at 424-25, 262 N.E.2d at 127-28. 
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proceeding. Whether the plaintiff delayed his request for the injunc-
tion until the last moment is a question which should bear upon the 
question of practical finality. If the plaintiff, knowing that he will 
seek an injunction, waits until right before the planned strike to re-
quest the injunction, that would militate in the direction of declaring 
the injunction to have pr:actical finality. The purpose of the practical 
finality-personal jurisdiction analysis is to prevent plaintiffs from de-
laying until the eleventh hour and fifty-ninth minute to petition for an 
injunction and, by the same token, to force the issues early into an 
adversary context. 
In Kankakee Teachers, the defendants were engaged in an enjoin-
able strike and the plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order. 
There was neither notice to the defendants nor an attempt to give no-
tice. The order was served upon the defendants but the strike con-
tinued. Two days later the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion. The injunction was granted following a hearing. Defendants 
appeared at the hearing but did not participate. The strike continued. 
Defendants were charged with contempt for violating the temporary 
restraining order.157 
The contempt conviction for breach of the temporary restraining 
order should not stand. The ex parte order forbade conduct in prog-
ress. The defendants, or some of them, were manning a picket line 
and thus available for notice. There must have been a moment be-
tween the decision to seek an injunction and the time the injunction 
was actually requested when the plaintiffs could have telephoned or 
otherwise notified the defendants. The temporary restraining order 
thus had practical finality; and following the analysis suggested here, 
because there was no advance notice, there was no jurisdiction over the 
person of the defendants and the order was void. It should be added 
that the plaintiffs did not lack a remedy. The preliminary injunction 
was granted after a hearing at which defendants appeared. While the 
injunction had practical finality, it was preceded by an adversary pro-
ceeding. Disobedience of the preliminary injunction was contempt, 
and the collateral bar rule could have been properly applied to preclude 
defenses to the injunction in the later contempt hearing. The defend-
ants had an opportunity and an incentive to litigate those issues during 
the hearing on the preliminary injunction and, having not seen fit to 
do so, the court may refuse to hear those issues later.158 Both the 
plaintiff and the defendant may be required to litigate before rather 
than after the event. 
In County of Peoria v. Benedict, a strike of nursing home em-
ployees was likely on November 30. The plaintiff notified the de-
157. 46 Ill. 2d at 442, 264 N.E.2d at 20.· 
158. Cf. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931 ). 
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fendants on November 27 that there would be a hearing November 
29th on a request for an injunction against the strike. The method of 
giving notice was by telephone in the afternoon and by service in the 
evening. Defendants did not appear at the hearing on the 29th, and 
a temporary injunction prohibiting the strike was granted and served 
before November 30. The strike began on November 30. Defend-
ants were charged with contempt for breaching the temporary injunc-
tion.159 
Contempt in this case was properly affirmed. According to the 
proposed analysis, the injunction might have had practical finality be-
cause it was granted on the day before the planned event. There was, 
however, notice both formal and informal; and, therefore, the court 
attained jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Defendants 
elected not to appear at the hearing, did not request a continuance to 
prepare, and, after the injunction was granted, refrained from taking 
advantage of Illinois' liberal provisions to move to dissolve.160 Instead 
they consciously chose to flout the commands of the injunction. The 
defendants had an opportunity and incentive to litigate and, therefore, 
the collateral bar rule was appropriately applied to preclude relitigation 
in contempt. 
The difficulty in Benedict springs from the decision of the Illinois 
Supreme Court that the injunction was erroneous and should not have 
been granted. The injunction was vacated, but the contempt was af-
firmed.161 Thus, the contemnors are punished for breaching an order 
which they should not have been required to obey and which would 
have been reversed on direct appeal. The decision of the circuit court 
to grant the injunction was, however, presumptively correct; and pend-
ing the appeal, no court had declared or held the injunction to be er-
roneous. To give effect to the policy of respect for the courts and to 
prevent litigants from appointing themselves judge in their own case, 
judicial orders must be tested in the courts in an orderly fashion. Only 
if the basic concepts of due process and jurisdiction are ignored in the 
granting process, may the defendants ignore an injunction with impu-
nity: this is the basic policy underlying the distinction between lack 
of power and mistaken use of power. There are also sound practical 
reasons for arguing before rather than after violating an injunction. 
If the defendants had appeared at the November 29 hearing, there 
would have been a better chance that the circuit judge would rule in 
their favor as the Illinois Supreme Court later did. Instead, their argu-
ments against the injunction were advanced to the circuit judge a month 
later. The circuit judge, at the later hearing, ·was asked to repudiate 
159. 47 Ill. 2d at 169, 265 N.E.2d at 142. 
160. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 15 (1971 ). 
161. 47 Ill. 2d at 171, 265 N.E.2d at 144. 
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a decision he had previously made. His injunction had been ignored. 
He was also presented with evidence of roofing nails thrown by the 
striking defendants on the driveway of the nursing home while volun-
teers were moving aged and infirm patients to another location. It does 
not require a deep understanding of human psychology to know that 
under these circumstances the circuit judge would be somewhat re-
luctant to dissolve the injunction. 
The last case is Mine Workers Hospital. Pickets began patrolling 
the plaintiff's hospital at a little after midnight. The picketing was or-
derly and peaceful. At 5:33 a.m. the same morning, a complaint was 
filed and a temporary restraining order was granted. No notice was 
given to the defendants. The order was served on the defendants at 
7:00a.m. Picketing ceased but began again in the afternoon and con-
tinued until the next day. The defendants were charged with con-
tempt for disobeying the temporary restraining order. 
Following the analysis suggested here, the contempt convictions 
should be reversed. The injunction prohibited conduct in progress 
and therefore had practical finality. It was awarded without notice 
and hearing although the defendants were available for notice. Ap-
plying the practical finality-personal jurisdiction analysis, the court did 
not achieve jurisdiction over the person of the defendants; and the in-
junction was void. The defendants could ignore the putative exercise 
of judicial power with impunity and assert its imperfections in any 
subsequent proceeding. The appellate court was correct in holding 
that the injunction was void, but following the suggested analysis, the 
reason-lack of jurisdiction of the court-is incorrect. The Illinois 
Supreme Court was right in holding that the circuit court had juris-
diction of the subject matter, but further analysis along the lines sug-
gested here leads to the conclusion that the circuit court did not attain 
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. The practical finality-
personal jurisdiction analysis is not doctrinal and abstract like subject 
matter jurisdiction, but responds to procedlllial realities. The plaintiff 
frustrated the adversary process. While the papers were being drafted 
or before, the union officers could have been called or the pickets told 
of the imminent request for an injunction. The plaintiff passed up 
that opportunity and instead secured an ex parte injunction against 
peaceful and, in retrospect, legal picketing. No realistic social goal 
is advanced by requiring obedience to such an order; and the practical 
finality-personal jurisdiction analysis releases the defendants from con-
tempt without damaging the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The practical finality-personal jurisdiction analysis does not 
change the result in many cases, but more often puts the result on an-
No. 2] DUE PROCESS IN INJUNCTION PROCEDURE 253 
other basis. It is more in accord with the adversary nature of our legal 
system and the requirements of due process than the existing doctrine. 
Legal changes in past years demonstrate conclusively that it is not pos-
sible to conceive a legal rule which is regarded with such universal 
approbation as to make the discussion of alternatives to it an, idle 
pastime. This article has suggested expanding due process and per-
sonal jurisdiction into equity procedure. 
The illinois Supreme Court has written one healthy addition to 
the law of personal jurisdiction162 and might well write another. The 
result could be fewer clandestine injunctions but more honesty in liti-
gation and a respect less ostentatious but more sincere. 
162. Gray v. American Radiator Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
